American or *Ethnic American* engage in these activities at more or less comparable rates vis-à-vis each other; similarly, those who identify as *Asian* or with their *Ethnic Group* appear to engage in these four activities at comparable rates. The relationship between racial or ethnic identification and protest activity appears to be minimal.

Although only a modest relationship (if any) is apparent between identity choices and the five forms of political engagement we analyze here, differences in participation by some other indicators of racial and ethnic identity are important. Table [4] summarizes the differences in level of participation in voting, contributing, contacting, protesting, and working with others in the community to solve problems by the two measures of linked fate, commonality with Asians and other racial groups, and experiences with discrimination and hate crimes.

In terms of voting, evidence of differences between respondents with varying levels of racial and political identity beyond the identity labels is scant. Only a sense of political commonality with other racial and ethnic groups has a positive relationship. In contrast, both of the commonality items—with Asians in this country and with other racial groups—are important with respect to contributions, with those holding a sense of commonality much more active in this form of engagement. Likewise, experiences with discrimination and hate crimes are also positively associated with making political contributions. Contacting officials shows a similar pattern to contributing, with strong relationships for the commonality and bias measures. This is also the case for activity with others in the community to solve problems. The same patterns are apparent, but to a lesser degree, for protest activity.

REFERENCES

Dave, Shilpa, Pawan Dhingra, Sunaina Maira, Partha Mazumdar, Lavina Dhingra Shankar, Jaideep Singh, and Rajini Srikanth. 2000. "De-Privileging Positions: Indian Americans, South Asian Americans, and the Politics of Asian American Studies." *Journal of Asian American Studies* 3 (1): 67–100.

Kibria, Nazli. 1998. "The Racial Gap: South Asian American Racial Identity and the Asian American Movement." In *A Part, Yet Apart: South Asians in Asian America, Asian American History and Culture*, edited by Lavina Dhingra Shankar and Rajini Srikanth. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Lowe, Lisa. 1996. *Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Shankar, Lavina Dhingra, and Rajini Srikanth, eds. 1998. *A Part, Yet Apart: South Asians in Asian America*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Takagi, Dana Y. 1998. *The Retreat from Race: Asian-American Admissions and Racial Politics*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Wei, William. 1993. *The Asian American Movement*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

10.2

JAN E. LEIGHLEY AND JONATHAN NAGLER

From *Who Votes Now? Demographics, Issues, Inequality, and Turnout in the United States*

A common conclusion from previous studies of non-voting was that voters and non-voters were not much different in terms of their attitudes about major political issues. Some concluded that it does not much matter who votes because popular pressure on the government would not change even if many more people voted. Leighley and Nagler offer an important corrective. They focus on issues of economic redistribution and find that voters and non-voters are actually quite different in their preferences over government-led redistribution. Voters are generally more conservative on economic redistribution issues than are non-voters, according to results from analysis of high-quality survey data.

Most discussions of the consequences of turnout focus on whether changes in the partisanship of the voters lead to changes in who wins the election. We believe it is also important to consider the governance consequences of turnout. Who wins an election is obviously important in a representative democracy. But once elected, officials have some flexibility to define their policy agendas and their policy priorities in ways that go beyond partisanship. . . . This argument shifts the focus from how representative voters are of nonvoters with respect to demographic characteristics to how representative voters are of nonvoters with respect to policy preferences.[1]

■ ■ ■

Given that nonvoters are disproportionately poor relative to voters, and have been since 1972, we expect to find sustained differences in the policy preferences of voters and nonvoters in presidential elections since 1972 on redistributive issues.

■ ■ ■

[E]lected officials are aware of the preferences of their supporters. [T]he poor and the wealthy might well support the same candidate and elect her; but when in office, she will pursue the policies preferred by voters (who are disproportionately wealthy) rather than those preferred by nonvoters (who

From Jan E. Leighley and Jonathan Nagler, *Who Votes Now? Demographics, Issues, Inequality, and Turnout in the United States* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).

are disproportionately poor). That means that for poor nonvoters to achieve substantive representation, it is not sufficient for rich voters to prefer the same *candidate* as poor nonvoters; they must also share the same *issue positions*. This possibility demands that we clearly understand whether voters hold the same policy positions as nonvoters if we are to understand the representational consequences of turnout.

We underscore the importance of this argument by noting that significant differences between voters and nonvoters have important electoral consequences even if voters and nonvoters have identical distributions of preferences across *candidates*. Imagine a world with two dimensions, and that voters who prefer the Republican candidate to the Democratic candidate do so based on economic issues, and voters who prefer the Democratic candidate to the Republican candidate do so based on social issues; but nonvoters who prefer the Republican candidate to the Democratic candidate do so based on social issues, and nonvoters who prefer the Democratic candidate to the Republican candidate do so based on economic issues. Assuming that equal proportions of voters and nonvoters prefer Republican candidates to Democratic candidates, it would make no difference to the *electoral outcome* whether the nonvoters stay home or whether they choose to become voters. But if we assume that elected officials know the preferences of those who vote for them and respond to those preferences, then it would make a tremendous difference to *governing outcomes* if the nonvoters choose to vote.

■ ■ ■

We consider citizens' preferences and attitudes as reflected in their political views, their preferences on redistributive issues, and their preferences on values-based issues. Figure [1] documents the policy differences between voters and nonvoters in presidential election years between 1972 and 2008, focusing on three redistributive policy questions: support for government spending on health; support for providing services; and support for government guaranteeing jobs.

We describe these questions as redistributive because they indicate the degree to which respondents support governmental services or policies that redistribute resources to the poor. For each question, respondents are asked to place themselves on a 7-point scale, with the high point indicating the most conservative policy position (opposing redistribution) and the low point indicating the most liberal policy position (supporting redistribution). In Figure [1] we plot the difference between the mean score of voters and the mean score of nonvoters on each issue. Positive values thus indicate that voters are more conservative than nonvoters, while negative values indicate that voters are more liberal than nonvoters.

As shown in Figure [1], we find consistent differences between voters and nonvoters on each of these issues. In each year since 1972, voters are more conservative than are nonvoters in their beliefs regarding how much the government should do to provide jobs, health insurance, and services. More

FIGURE [1] Differences between Voters' and Nonvoters' Attitudes on Redistributive Policies, 1972–2008



NOTE: Plotted values are the weighted mean difference between voters' and nonvoters' attitudes on each issue in the specified year. Values greater than 0 indicate that voters (as a group) are more conservative than nonvoters (as a group) on the specific policy question; values less than 0 indicate that voters are more liberal than nonvoters. All mean differences are significant at $p < .05$, except 1972 for guaranteed jobs, 1984 for government health insurance, and 2000 for government service. Computed by the authors using data from the American National Election Studies Time Series Cumulative File, 1972–2008.

specifically, except for the difference between voters and nonvoters on government health insurance and job guarantees in 1972 and on government health insurance in 1984, the difference between voters and nonvoters is statistically significant in each election. Substantively, the mean differences on all three issues are typically greater than .4 on a 7-point scale. This suggests that voters are about one-half a scale position more conservative than are nonvoters. As we expected, then, there are notable, consistent and substantial differences between voters and nonvoters on redistributive issues—and the conventional wisdom should be updated accordingly.

Next we consider the representativeness of voters on two different sets of issues that we refer to as values-based issues and political attitudes. We present these results in separate graphs. We expect the responses to the first set of questions, including party identification, party ideology, and candidate preference, to be most sensitive to the particular electoral context (i.e., the nature of the issues, campaign strategy, etc.). We therefore expect these attitudes—and candidate preference, in particular—to be most likely to change election by election.

In contrast, the second set of issues [is] largely motivated by some sense of "values": the role of women/women's equality, aid to blacks, and defense spending. While we are not arguing that this is a coherent set of opinions that share[s]

common demographic or attitudinal sources, we do believe that each of these likely reflects more personal, fundamental symbolic beliefs than the other issues we consider. As such, we expect them to likely exhibit little sensitivity to election-specific contexts.

We turn to the representativeness of voters and nonvoters on political attitudes first. The party identification and political ideology measures are based on the standard NES 7-point party identification and political ideology questions. The vote preference measure is based on respondents' thermometer rankings of the two major presidential candidates in each election year. We first compute the difference between voters' evaluations of the Republican and Democratic candidates and then compute the same value for nonvoters. We then take the difference between these two scores and then, for graphing purposes, rescale it to be comparable to values on a 7-point scale.

Figure [2] presents the mean differences between voters and nonvoters on party identification, political ideology, and candidate vote preference for 1972 through 2008.[2] The values that are plotted for each attitude or preference (i.e., the vertical axis values) are the mean differences between voters and nonvoters for each attitude or preference. Based on our general knowledge of

FIGURE [2] Differences between Voters and Nonvoters on Ideology, Partisanship, and Vote Preference



NOTE: Plotted values are the weighted mean difference between voters and nonvoters on each opinion item in the specified year. Values greater than 0 indicate that voters (as a group) are more conservative than nonvoters (as a group) on the specific attitude; values less than 0 indicate that voters are more liberal than nonvoters. Mean differences on partisanship (except 1992 and 1996) and vote preference (except 1988, 1992, 2000, and 2004) are significant at $p < .05$. Mean differences on ideology are significant at $p < .05$ only in 1988, 1996, and 2004. Computed by the authors using data from the American National Election Studies Time Series Cumulative File, 1972–2008.

the interrelationships among partisanship, ideology, and vote choice, we expected these three measures to move largely in sync with each other, and that is mostly what we see. And because vote preference is necessarily tied to candidate characteristics, we see this difference between voters and nonvoters varying the most from election to election, as we would expect.

We note that in many of these elections we observe statistically significant differences between voters and nonvoters on partisanship and vote preference. These differences are statistically significant in six of ten elections for vote preference and eight of ten elections for partisanship. Statistically significant differences between voters and nonvoters on ideology are less common, observed in only two elections, 1988 and 1996, though in seven of the ten elections voters in our sample are ideologically more conservative than nonvoters.[3] Thus we find that voters are more conservative than nonvoters on partisanship, candidate preference, and ideology, although the evidence is more robust for partisanship and candidate preference.

Figure [3] presents the mean differences between voters and nonvoters on values-based issues for 1972 through 2008. Our expectations of null findings

FIGURE [3] Differences between Voters' and Nonvoters' Attitudes on Values-Based Issues



NOTE: Plotted values are the weighted mean difference between voters' and nonvoters' attitudes on each issue in the specified year. Values greater than 0 indicate that voters (as a group) are more conservative than nonvoters (as a group) on the specific policy question; values less than 0 indicate that voters are more liberal than nonvoters. Mean differences on women's equality are significant at $p < .05$ in 1972, 1980, 1992, and 2000. Mean differences on aid to blacks are significant at $p < .05$ in 1976. Computed by the authors using data from the American National Election Studies Time Series Cumulative File, 1972–2008.

here are generally supported. The magnitude of the difference between voters and nonvoters on aid to blacks and defense spending is generally less than 0.1. Larger differences between voters and nonvoters on women's equality are observed, and are statistically significant in four years (1972, 1980, 1992, and 2000), but even these differences disappear in the two most recent elections. Generally, then, we find little or no systematic differences between voters and nonvoters on these values-based issues.

■ ■ ■

We take issue with the claim that voters are indeed representative of nonvoters. [I]n every election year from 1972 through 2008, voters and nonvoters differ substantively on most issues relating to the role of government in redistributive policies. In addition to these differences being evident in every election since 1972, we also note that the nature of the electoral bias is clear as well: voters are substantially more conservative than nonvoters on redistributive issues.

NOTES

1. See Erikson and Tedin (2011, fig. 7:1) for a simple demonstration of the differences between the preferences of voters and nonvoters on economic issues.
2. Mean differences are computed using the NES supplied weights.
3. Ideology could be interpreted differently by different respondents, and differently across elections. Some respondents might be emphasizing a social dimension in their evaluation of ideology; others might be emphasizing an economic dimension in their evaluation of ideology.

10.3

EITAN D. HERSH

From *Hacking the Electorate: How Campaigns Perceive Voters*

Technological advances have enabled campaign organizations and political parties to target specific individuals in "get out the vote" appeals. In eight states (all in the south), people indicate their race—white, black, Hispanic—when registering to vote. Hersh compares turnout rates between African Americans in these eight states to those in other similar states. He also compares turnout rates in the eight states among those who choose to identify their race and those who do not. Hersh finds compelling evidence that if campaigns can know a person's race, that person is more likely to be contacted by a campaign and more likely to turn out to vote. This shows how campaigns can increasingly focus on individual attributes in targeting their appeals specifically and directly, in contrast to previous attempts to campaign using broad themes in entire neighborhoods and sectors.

When public records of race are available to campaigns, campaigns focus more on mobilizing voters because of their racial identity and less on mobilizing voters because they live in racially segregated areas. . . . [C]ampaigns focus more attention on voters' races when public race data are available. [T]he patterns of voter turnout are consistent with the proposition that campaigns behave differently depending on the public data environment.

Public Records of Racial Identity

Voter registration databases in eight states, all in the south, contain records of racial identity. In these states, which include Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee, the public record lists voters as Caucasian, Black, Hispanic, or by some other racial identifier. When citizens register to vote in these states, they are asked or required to indicate their race, and this designation becomes a public record. Because in the United States racial identity is highly correlated with partisan support, when a voter's race is listed in the public record, campaigns latch onto this data point as a key resource for engaging with voters. Because racial identity is difficult to predict in the absence of public race data, campaigns have a more

From Eitan D. Hersh, *Hacking the Electorate: How Campaigns Perceive Voters* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015).